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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
ARKANSAS OIL & GAS LAW
Carolyn J. Clegg
KEITH, CLEGG & ECKERT
Magnolia, Arkansas
CASES
A.

REPORTED ARKANSAS and ARKANSAS FEDERAL CASES
(1)

Gilbreath v. Union Bank, 309
Ark. 360, 830 S .W.2d 854 (1992)
Before effective date of legislation permitting
separate assessments for severed mineral interests,
failure to subjoin assessment of mineral interests
voided subsequent tax deeds as to those interests.
Trustee holding record title to mineral interests
sold at tax sale was not foreclosed from contesting
validity of quiet-title decree more than 90 days
after decree, where trustee was never notified by
personal service or warning order of quiet title
action, and limitation statute specifically allowed
court to entertain independent action to relieve
from judgment any party not personally served with
process.

(2)

Moore & Munger Marketing and Refining, Inc. v. Hawkins,
962 F .2d 806 (8th Cir. 1992)
Lessee of Chapter 7 debtor's oil pipeline system
was not entitled to adjustment in contract price
for purchase of "division orders", which described
what properties produced oil delivered through pipeline and named persons who should receive payment for
that oil, even though 59 orders were maintained by
company other than debtor and 82 pertained to properties not producing oil; agreement provided a price
adjustment only for those "division orders" rejected
after initial 15 day period and only under certain
specified conditions, and lessee did not contend that
it rejected orders at issue after 15-day period or for
any of the stated conditions.

(3)

Harris v. Stephens Production Company, et al
310 Ark. 67 (1992)
Where a conveyance and bill of sale, purportedly
for an oil well, also conveyed "Oil and Gas Leases",
the instrument was ambiguous as to whether it conveyed only the the well or the oil and gas leases
in the unit, and the Chancellor correctly allowed
parol evidence to aid in the construction of the
vague phrase "Oil and Gas Leases".
Page Two

(4)

Klein v. Jerral W. Jones and Michael v. McCoy,
________ F .2d __________ (8th Cir. 1991)
Klein v. Arkoma Production Company, et a l ,
________ F .2d _________ (8th Cir. 1991).
These class action cases filed were by representatives of a class of about 3,000 royalty owners whose
claims derived from oil and gas leases on property
located in the Arkoma Basin in Western Arkansas.
The royalty owners were seeking to share in the
take-or-pay settlement between Arkoma
and McCoy) and Arkla.

(Jones

The trial court found that

the royalty owners were not entitled to share in
the absence of "production", and further held that
the three-year Statute of Limitations was applicable
to a breach of the implied covenant to market g a s .
On April 21, 1991, the trial court entered its
order dismissing the entire action.

The Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals on November 24, 1992,
reversed the dismissal of the action on the grounds
that the action was barred by the Statute of
Limitations and remanded to the trial court.

The

Court determined that money received by a lessee
in exchange for surrendering a valuable claim under
the take or pay provisions of the contract is a
benefit that should be shared with the royalty
owners.
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(5)

Stephens Production Company et al v. Johnson, et al
311 Ark. 206 (1992)
Suit by mineral owners to cancel 30 year old leases
for breach of implied covenants to protect from drainage and to further develop and explore and to recover
damages for drainage.

Chancellor cancelled leases

(except for existing bore holes) for failure to further
develop but awarded no damages for drainage.

Both

sides appealed.
Where there was no abstract, by either the Appellants
or the Cross-Appellants, of the Complaint, the CrossComplaint, or either of the Answers, nor was there an
abstract of the Chancellor’s findings of fact on the
final order, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that it
had no choice but to affirm the final order for failure
of the parties to comply with Rule 9 (d); it is necessary
for a party to abstract the essential parties of the
proceedings relied upon for appeal purposes.
B.

Cases of Interest Currently
(1)

(1/1/93) on Appeal

Emily Kitchens Kolb, et al v. Issac Morgan, et al
No. 92-01344, Appeal from Chancery Court of Columbia
County Arkansas, to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
P ag e F ou r

An interpleader action involving a partition in kind
by family members in 1952.

Issue was whether or not

as a result of a prior mineral conveyance by one
family member, the partition vested title in fee
simple to the family members on only title to the
surface.

Chancellor held that only the surface

estate was partitioned by the Court in its Partition
Decree in 1952.
Defendants.
(2)

Crystal Oil Company, et al vs. Donald Warmack, No.
92-01102, Appeal from Chancery Court of Union County,
Arkansas to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Case involving cancellation of a 1963 oil and gas
lease

(covering 200 acres), insofar as it pertained

to 120 acres, for failure of original lessee and
its assigns to continue the development of the
entire lease and, in particular, the 120 acres for
22 years, and for abandonment of purposes of the
contract for many years prior to 1985.

The

Chancellor cancelled the lease as to the 120
acres, and ordered that Defendants make an
accounting to Plaintiff.

P a g e F iv e

Defendants appealed.
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Ray GILBREATH v. UNION BANK, Successor Trustee of
the Catherine C. Morgan Trust
92-52
Suprem e Court of Arkanas
Opinion delivered M ay 11, 1992
1.

T a x a t i o n — ta x as ses sme nt — effect
of f a il u re to s u b j o i n
ASSESSMENT OF MINERAL INTEREST TO ASSESSMENT OF SURFACE

. — Although the General Assembly has passed legislation to permit separate assessment for severed mineral interests, the
law at the time the tax deeds were issued was that failure to subjoin
the assessment of mineral interests did void subsequent tax deeds
for those interests purchased at tax sales.
Ju d g m e n t — a t t a c k by in t e r e s t e d n o n - pa r t y a f te r n i n e t y
d a y s . — The trustee, as the owner of the mineral interest, was never
appropriately notified by personal service or warning order of
appellant’s lawsuit to quiet title and should not be bound by the
resulting decree, especially in light of the language in Ark. R. Civ.
P; 60(k) that specifically provides that the rule does not limit the
power of the court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment when that party was not served personally
with process.
P roce ss — se r v i c e o f pr o c e s s by pu b l i c a t i o n — b u r d e n of
pr o o f o n pa r t y a t t e m pt i n g s e r v i c e . — The burden is on the
party attempting service by publication to attempt to locate the
missing or unknown defendant, and is required to demonstrate to
the court, by affidavit or otherwise, that after diligent inquiry, the
defendant’s identity or whereabouts remains unknown.
P rocess
— se r v ic e o f pr o c e ss by pu b l i c a t i o n — a f f id a v it
f a c i a l l y de f e c t i v e — s e r v i c e i m pr o pe r . — Where no diligent
inquiry was made under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1), as evidenced by
appellant’s failure to conclude in his affidavit that the location of the
original trustee was unknown, the appellant’s affidavit for a
warning order was facially defective.
A ppe a l & er ror — s u ppl e m e n t a l ab s tr a ct h e l pf u l b u t no t
n e c e s s a r y . — Where appellee’s supplemental abstract was helpful, but not considered to be necessary under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 9(d)
for an understanding of the issues presented, the motion for costs
was denied.
in t e r e s t

2.

3.

4.

5.

Appeal from Sebastian Chancery Court; Harry A. Foltz,
Judge; affirmed; Motion for Costs, denied.

A r k .]
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Cite as 309 Ark. 360 (1992)

Walters Law Firm, P.A., by: Michael Hamby , for appellant.
Daily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield, by: Janice West
Whitt, for appellee.
Ro be r t L. Br o w n , Justice. This appeal relates to the

validity of five tax deeds granted to the appellant, Ray Gilbreath,
for mineral interests in land located in Sebastian County. The
chancery court entered summary judgment, setting aside a
decree which quieted title in those interests in the appellant. The
appellant now appeals and asserts error on grounds a) that the
Trustee was procedurally foreclosed from attacking the decree,
and b) that the chancery court erred in finding the tax deed void.
W e disagree, and we affirm the chancery court’s decision.
The facts are somewhat involved. On August 31, 1970,
Catherine C. Morgan, a California resident, deeded the mineral
interests in question to herself as trustee o f the Catherine C.
Morgan Trust. She was not the owner of the surface rights, and
the surface rights were not involved in this litigation. On October
12, 1978, Morgan died, and California First Bank (now Union
Bank) was named successor trustee by the California Superior
Court. On July 27, 1981, California First Bank (now Union
Bank), as Trustee, executed an oil and gas lease in favor of
Stephens Production Company covering part o f the mineral
interests in question. This lease was recorded in the Sebastian
County Circuit Clerk’s office on October 31, 1981, but the deed
indexes did not reflect that the lessor bank was leasing the mineral
interests to Stephens in its capacity as Trustee. The mineral
interests were not subjoined to the surface interests for assessment purposes in 1981.
Real estate taxes were not paid on the mineral interests in
1981, and those interests were declared to be delinquent and
forfeited to the state that same year. In November 1982, the
appellant bought the mineral interests at a tax sale conducted by
the Sebastian County Sheriff, and on January 11, 1985, the
Sebastian County Clerk granted five tax deeds to him for the
mineral interests which he duly recorded on January 14, 1985.
On May 13, 1985, the appellant filed a petition to quiet title
for the mineral interests and named as defendants Catherine C.
Morgan, both individually and in her capacity as trustee, and all
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other persons, known and unknown, who claimed any interest in
the mineral rights. That same day an affidavit for warning order
was executed by the appellant, which gave M organ’s last known
address but did not state that her whereabouts was unknown.
Also on May 13, 1985, the Sebastian Chancery Clerk issued a
N otice o f Quiet Title Action for publication as the warning order.
On May 17, 1985, an appointed attorney ad litem sent a letter to
Morgan’s last known address in California which was returned
unclaimed on June 18,1985, When no response resulted, a decree
quieting title to the mineral interests in the appellant was entered
on July 22, 1985.
Four years later, on July 2 4 ,1 9 8 9 , the Trustee filed an action
to set aside the quiet-title decree on grounds that the appellant’s
tax deeds were void because the 1981 assessments of the mineral
interests were not subjoined to those o f the surface owners. An
additional ground for relief was the failure to serve the Trustee, as
owner o f the mineral interests. The Trustee asked the court to set
aside the quiet title decree and for repayment o f the royalties paid
to the appellant. The Trustee also moved for summary judgment.
On July 2 ,1 9 9 1 , the chancery court granted the Trustee the relief
requested and entered summary judgment in its favor.
[1] The pivotal issue in this case is whether the failure of the
Sebastian County Assessor to subjoin assessments of mineral
interests to assessments o f surface interests in 1981 rendered the
resulting tax deeds void. W e hold that it did. Our law at that time
was clear that the failure to subjoin the assessment o f mineral
interests did void subsequent tax deeds for those interests purchased at tax sales. Garvan v. Potlatch Corp., 278 Ark. 414, 645
S.W .2d 957 (1983); Hurst v. Rice , 278 Ark. 9 4 ,6 4 3 S.W .2d 563
(1982); Adams v. Bruder, 275 Ark. 16, 627 S.W .2d 12 (1982);
Sorkin v. Meyers , 216 Ark. 9 0 8 ,2 2 7 S.W .2d 958 (1950). We are
aware that the General Assembly passed legislation, effective
April 15, 1985, to permit separate assessments for severed
mineral interests, but that was long after the 1981 assessments
which are at issue in this case. See Act 961 of 1985, now codified
as Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1 112 (1987). Accordingly, the
chancery court was correct in its decision, and the tax deeds were
void from date of the 1981 assessments due to failure to subjoin.
(2]

The appellant further contends that the Trustee was

A r k .]
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foreclosed under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(k) from coming into court
more than ninety days after the quiet-title decree and contesting
the validity of that decree. W e hold otherwise on the basis that the
Trustee, as the owner o f the mineral interests, was never appropriately notified by personal service or warning order of the
appellant’s lawsuit to quiet title and should not be bound by that
decree. See Hurst v. Rice, supra. The Trustee was entitled to have
its day in court and to raise the subjoinder issue, especially in light
o f the language in Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(k) which specifically
provides that the rule does not limit the power o f the court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgm ent when that party was not served personally with process.
It is undisputed that the Trustee was not personally served.
N or was it constructively served according to procedures required
under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 ( 0 ( 1 ) . Rule 4 ( 0 ( 1 ) reads in part:
(1) Where it appears by the affidavit o f a party or his
attorney that, after diligent inquiry, the identity or whereabouts of a defendant remains unknown, service shall be by
warning order issued by the clerk and published weekly for
two consecutive weeks in a newspaper having general
circulation in a county wherein the action is filed and by
m ailing a copy o f the complaint and warning order to such
defendant at his last known address, if any, by any form of
mail with delivery restricted to the addressee or the agent
of the addressee.
Here, the affidavit o f the appellant did not state that, after
making diligent inquiry, Catherine C. Morgan’s whereabouts
was unknown which is a condition in the rule for the warning
order’s issuance.
[3]
Comment 12 to R ule 4 (f)(1) explains the burden that a
party must meet to avail him self of service by publication:
The burden is on the party attempting service by
publication to attempt to locate the missing or unknown
defendant. Such party or his attorney is required to
demonstrate to the court, by affidavit or otherwise, that
after diligent inquiry, the defendant’s identity or whereabouts remains unknown.

That burden was simply not met in this case. The appellant filed
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his petition to quiet title in the mineral interests on May 13, 1985,
and on that same day filed an affidavit for a warning order which
said;
That he has made diligent inquiry and that it is his
information that the defendant, Catherine C. Morgan,
Individually, and Catherine C. Morgan, Trustee, is a
nonresident of the State of Arkansas . . . .
The appellant then listed Morgan’s last known address in
California. Also, on May 13, 1985, the Sebastian County
Chancery Clerk issued the warning order. Four days later, on
May 17, 1985, the attorney ad litem for Catherine C. Morgan
sent a certified letter to her California address which was
returned unclaimed on June 18, 1985.
[4]
Where no diligent inquiry is made under rule 4 (0 ( 1 ),
we have affirmed dismissal of a complaint for improper service of
process. See Smith v. Edwards , 295 Ark. 182, 747 S.W .2d 580
(1988). It is obvious in the case before us that the requisite inquiry
was not made because the appellant did not conclude in his
affidavit that the location of Catherine M organ was unknown.
Accordingly, we hold that the appellant’s affidavit for a warning
order is facially defective under Rule 4 (0 ( 1 ).
To summarize, because there was no subjoinder of mineral
interests to surface interests in the tax assessments in 1981, the
five tax deeds granted the appellant in 1985 were void. Further,
because the affidavit for warning order was deficient on its face
under Rule 4 (0 (1 ), constructive service by publication was not
effective against the Trustee. Our decision on these points make it
unnecessary to reach the other issues raised by the appellant.
[5]
The Trustee moves for costs totaling $329.75 occasioned by preparation of a supplemental abstract which it deemed
necessary for consideration of the appeal. W hile the pleadings
and discovery requests abstracted by the Trustee were helpful on
appeal, we do not consider that they were necessary under Ark.

A r k .]
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Sup. Ct. R. 9(d) for our understanding of the issues presented.
The motion for costs is denied.
Affirmed. Trustee’s motion for costs denied.
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Based on the foregoing, we believe there
is substantial evidence in the record to support the Secretary's denial of disability benefits for the time prior to September 30,
1979.

Appeals held that lessee was not entitled
adjustment in contract price, even though
59 orders were maintained by company oth
er than debtor and 82 pertained to properties not producing oil.

Onstead’s remaining contention is rejected as without merit.
The order affirming the Secretary’s denial of disability benefits is affirmed.

M OORE & M UNGER MARKETING
A N D R E FIN IN G , INC.,
A ppellant,
v.
C laude H AW K INS, T ru stee o f M acM illan
P etro leu m (A rk an sas), M bank D a lla s,
N.A., M corp M an agem en t S o lu tio n s,
In c., A p p ellees.
No. 91-3473.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted April 16, 1992.
Decided April 23, 1992.
Lessee of Chapter 7 debtor’s oil pipeline system sought determination that it
did not owe the full contract price for purchase of "division orders,” which described
what properties produced oil developed
through pipeline and named persons who
should receive payment for that oil. The
United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Arkansas, James G.
Mixon, J., denied lessee’s claim for relief,
and lessee appealed. The District Court,
Oren Harris, Senior District Judge, affirmed, and lessee appealed. The Court of
* T h e H O N O R A B L E A ND REW W. BOGUE, U nited
S ta te s S e n io r District J u d g e for the District of
S o u th Dakota, sitting by d esig n atio n .
1.

T he H o n o r a b le O ren H arris. U nited S tates
S e n io r District Ju d g e for the W estern District of
A rkansas.

Affirmed.
M ines and M inerals 79.1(3)

Lessee of Chapter 7 debtor’s oil pipe
line system was not entitled to adjustment
in contract price for purchase of “divi
orders,” which described what prop
produced oil delivered through pipelin e
named persons who should receive
ment for that oil, even though 59
were maintained by company other
debtor and 82 pertained to proper
producing oil; agreement provided a
adjustment only for those "division o n l f i f c
rejected after initial 15-day period aitSKwHI
under certain specified conditions,
see did not contend that it rejected
at issue after 15-day period or for
the stated conditions.
Charles Nestrud, Janie McFarlin, Lina
Rock, Ark., for appellant.
Gregory Hopkins, Charles Coleman, H i
Price, Little Rock, Ark., for appellees
Before FAGG and WOLLMAN, Circuit
Judges, and BOGUE,* Senior District
Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Moore & Munger Marketing and MOmm
ing, Inc. appeals from the district court
judgment
affirming
the
bankruptcy
court’s 2 denial of its claim for relief.
affirm.
I.

Macmillan Petroleum (Arkansas),
("MacArk”) leased its oil pipeline system
2.

The H o n o ra b le J a m e s G. Mixon, U nited S
taes
B an k ru p tc y Ju d g e for the W estern District
A rkansas.

MOORE & MUNGER MARKETING & REFINING v. HAWKINS
Cite as 962 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1992)

& Munger Marketing and Refining,
(“Moore”). MacArk also agreed to sell
information—“division orders”—to
The division orders described what
erties produced oil delivered through
k’s pipeline and named the persons
should receive payment for that oil.

agreement stated that MacArk had
division orders “currently in e ffe c t”
1.2 of the agreement granted Moore
ight to peruse the 358 division orders
fifteen days and return those it did not
nt The number of division orders r e
after the fifteen day period comthe “Purchased Number.”
"

agreement also noted that subse’eyents could reduce the value of the
bn contained in the division orlause 4 therefore provided that,
c ertain conditions occurred, Moore
reject division orders that it had iniretained among the Purchased Num4 also provided for a correftdjustment to the contract price.
adjustment was calculated by deterpercentage change in the Pur;Number caused by the subsequent
delivered the division orders to
Moore retained 140 of them, and
tly rejected two. Moore then
a n action in MacArk’s Chapter 7
proceeding, claiming, among
gs, that it did not owe the full
rice. Moore introduced evidence
had only 217 division orders,
because fifty-nine division orders
tained by another company, not
ain
m
and eighty-two division orders
to properties not producing oil.
argued that, since it had the opporw acquire oil under only 217 division
not 358, the contract price should
uced accordingly.
red
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ders that Moore rejected, and the district
court affirmed.
II.

Moore argues that de novo review is
appropriate because the parties written
contract is unambiguous. See Case In t’l
Co. v. T.L James
C o 907
.,
F.2d 65 (8th
Cir. 1990) (review de novo district court's
interpretation of an unambiguous contract).
As MacArk does not dispute this contention, we review the contract de novo.
Moore argues that the contract price
should be revised to reflect the lack of
value in the fifty-nine division orders maintained by another company and the eightytwo division orders pertaining to properties
not producing oil.
The agreement does not allow for such
an adjustment
Clause 1.2 permitted
Moore to return any or all of the division
orders for any reason, but does not provide
for a corresponding price adjustment The
agreement provides a price adjustment
only for those division orders rejected after
the initial fifteen day period, and only under those conditions specified in Clause 4.
Moore does not contend that it rejected the
141 division orders at issue after the fifteen day period, or for any o f the causes
stated in Clause 4. We therefore conclude
that the district court properly held Moore
liable for the full contract price, less an
adjustment for the two division orders rejected in accordance with Clause 4.
The judgment of the district court is
affirmed.

bankruptcy court held that Moore
•liable for the full contract price, less a
m
inoradjustment for the two division orlnstead of the actual division orders, MacArk
delivered a “division of interest sheet," The
district court concluded that this constituted
substantial perform ance, and Moore does not

appeal that conclusion. For the sake of conve
nience we will refer to the docum ents as divi
sion orders.

A r k .]
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67

lant moved to dismiss with prejudice his case against Dow
Chemical. Dow Chemical then moved to dismiss with prejudice
its cross-appeal. Both motions are granted.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed with prejudice
in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Joe Wayne H A R R IS and Elena Harris v. ST E PH E N S
PR O D U C TIO N C O M PA N Y , et al.

92-269
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered June 29, 1992
1.

2.

3.

C o n t r a c t s — parol e v i d e n c e pr o pe r l y pe r m it t e d . — Where
a conveyance and bill of sale, purportedly for an oil well, also
conveyed “Oil and Gas Leases,” the instrument was ambiguous as
to whether it conveyed only the well or the oil and gas leases in the
unit, and the chancellor correctly allowed parol evidence to aid in
the construction of the vague phrase “Oil and Gas Leases.”
R ef orm at ion o f i n st r u m e n t s — n o er ror si n c e do c u m e n t
n o t r e f o rm ed . — Since the trial court did not remake or reform
the instrument, but rather allowed parol evidence for the purpose of
construing the instrument as written, it did not err in “remaking”
the instrument as appellant argues.
C o nt ra ct s — c o n s t r u c t i o n — in s t r u m e n t c o n s t r u e d
AGAINST DRAFTER — PRIMARILY CONSTRUED TO GIVE EFFECT TO
i n t e n t i o n OF part ie s . — While an instrument is to be construed

4.

most strongly against the party that prepared it, the primary rule in
the construction of instruments is that the court must, if possible,
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties.
A ppe a l & err or — failu re t o a r g u e po i n t in o r i g i n a l br ie f .
— The court did not reach the merits of appellant’s argument where
it was not discussed in the appellant’s original brief; points may not
be argued only in reply.
Appeal from Crawford Chancery Court, Division I; Warren

O. Kimbrough, Chancellor; affirmed.

Ray Edwards of Edwards & Edwards, Charles “Chuck"
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Dyer, and Batchelor & Batchelor, by: Fines, F. Batchelor, Jr ., for
appellants.
Daily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield, by: Michael C.
Carter and Janice West Whitt, for appellee.
Ro b e rt H. D u dle y , Justice. The plaintiffs, Joe and Elena
Harris, filed this suit claiming a 100% working interest ownership o f the oil, gas, and mineral rights in a 40-acre tract and the
concomitant rights to the proceeds from a nearby commercially
producing well that is located in the same drilling unit. The
chancellor found the plaintiffs' claims to be without merit, and
they appeal. The ruling o f the chancellor was correct, and we
affirm.
In 1961, Bert Tankersley leased his oil, gas, and mineral
interest in 100 acres to Gulf Oil Corporation. The lease included
the 40 acres at issue in the north half o f section 8, plus 60 acres in
section 9. Stephens Production Co., the defendant, and appellee,
subsequently acquired the leasehold working interest of the 40acre tract in section 8 and then pooled and unitized for drilling the
north half o f section 8 and the south half o f section 5. Stephens
owned 100 % of the oil and gas leases in the 640-acre drilling unit.
In 1970-71, Stephens drilled a gas well, the Harris-Chitwood N o.
1, on the 40 acres in section 8. The well produced for six years, but
ceased commercial production in 1977. When commercial production ceased, 70% of Stephens’ leases in the unit lapsed due to
non-production. Stephens held the remaining 30 % by production
since those leases contained acreage that was in other producing
units. Earlier, in June 1968, Chevron had drilled the ChevronW hitlock N o. 1 Well in the section 9 drilling unit that contained
the other 60 acres of the Tankersley lease. The ChevronW hitlock No. 1 Well has produced in paying quantities since
1968 and so, unless otherwise terminated, Stephens holds the 40acre tract by virtue of production on the 60 acres.
Plaintiffs, Joe and Elena Harris, through the years purchased four tracts of land, comprising about 500 acres, all located
in the immediate area. One of the tracts, which was apparently
purchased in 1974, is the 40-acre tract in section 8. The HarrisChitwood N o. 1 is located 2,000 feet north of plaintiffs’ house.
After the Harris-Chitwood No. 1 ceased commercial pro-

A r k .1
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duction, Stephens attempted without success to interest other
production companies in drilling in the unit and, in 1980, decided
to cap the well. When Stephens sent a crew to cap the well,
plaintiff Joe Harris met them and asked them not to cap it, but
instead to let the Harrises use the gas from the well for their home.
A Stephens vice-president told Harris that he would have to get
the approval of the Oil and Gas Commission. With the help of his
attorney, Harris drafted a letter to the Commission asking it to
allow him to assume the responsibility and the liability for the
well and for the future expense of capping of it. The Commission
responded by letter telling Harris what he would have to do in
order to be allowed to use the well for his personal use. About a
year later, Stephens wrote the Harrises and told them that it
would cap the well if it did not hear from them in forty-five days.
There was additional correspondence and then, in October of
1982, Stephens mailed to the Harrises a “Conveyance and Bill of
Sale,” with a copy to the Commission and to the plaintiffs’
attorney. The Harrises paid nothing for the conveyance. In 1983,
the commission gave the Harrises the right to use the well for
household purposes.
In 1986, TXO Production Corp. became interested in
drilling another well in the same unit in which the HarrisChitwood No. 1 is located and, to that end, leased some of the
Harrises’ other property, but not the 40 acres at issue. TXO
declined to take a lease from the plaintiffs on the 40 acres at issue
because it concluded that was held by Stephens as a result of
production. Stephens participated in the drilling of the well, the
Wamock No. 1, which was successfully completed in December
of 1986. The well is in commercial production, and Stephens has
paid royalties to the plaintiffs since production began. Over two
years after the completion of the Wamock No. 1, the plaintiffs
filed this suit claiming a 100% working interest ownership in the
40-acre tract because of the 1982 “Conveyance and Bill of Sale.”
Stephens counters that the conveyance shows on its face that it
conveyed only the well, while the plaintiffs contend that it
conveyed the entire unit. The chancellor ruled that some of the
language in the instrument was ambiguous and allowed parol
evidence to determine the true intent of the parties. The plaintiffs
assign this ruling as error. The nature of the case itself tends to
show the correctness of the chancellor’s ruling. The Harrises
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contend that the instrument conveyed the gas leases in the unit,
while Stephens contends that it conveyed only the well. The
instrument provides:
That in consideration o f the sum on O N E D O LLA R
($1.00), the receipt o f which is hereby acknowledged, and
the further release o f all liability and responsibility,
S T E P H E N S PR O D U C T IO N C O M P A N Y does hereby
SE L L , D ELIV ER and T R A N SFE R unto JOE H A R R IS,
Route 1, Alm a, Arkansas 72921, all o f its interest in and to
the physical equipment, Oil and Gas Leases, and all other
property rights owned, used or held by it in connection with
the Harris-Chitwood #1 Well located 850 feet East and
530 feet South of the Northwest corner o f the Northwest
Quarter o f the Northeast Quarter (N W /4 N E /4 ) of
Section 8, Township 9 North, Range 30 W est, Crawford
County, Arkansas. This conveyance is made without
warranty of title, either express or implied, and is also
without representation as to the quantity, quality or
continued life of the subject well.
Joe Harris, by the acceptance o f this conveyance,
hereby agrees and stipulates that the interest conveyed
hereby shall not be transferred or conveyed, in whole or in
part, to any other person or party and the gas, if any,
produced from said well shall not be sold, bartered or
conveyed to any other person or party, it being understood
that the gas is for the personal, sole and exclusive use o f Joe
Harris on the premises adjacent to the wellhead.
A s a part of the consideration for this transfer, Joe
Harris hereby stipulates and agrees that Stephens Production Company shall not be responsible for the plugging of
said well nor shall it be liable for any claims or obligations
in connection with the production of gas therefrom. Joe
Harris agrees hereby to hold Stephens Production Company harmless from the claims o f all persons whomsoever
arising out of or in connection with the operation or
production of gas from the Harris-Chitwood #1 Well and
from any and all actions, causes of action, claims and
demands for, upon, and by reason of any damage, loss or
injury sustained by anyone in consequence o f the further
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operations of said well.
EXECUTED this 11th day of October, 1982.
With the exception of one phrase, the instrument would not
be ambiguous, and its purpose clearly would have been only to
sell, deliver, and transfer to the plaintiffs the well. However, in the
seventh line, the instrument contains the phrase “Oil and Gas
Leases” and, arguably, the instrument could be construed to
mean that it conveyed Stephens’ oil and gas leases in the unit.
Thus, it contained an ambiguity, and the chancellor allowed parol
evidence to aid in the construction of the vague phrase. The
chancellor’s ruling was correct. In Mays v. Barnett, 150 Ark. 492,
496, 234 S.W. 488, 489 (1921), we quoted with approval from
Brown & Hackney v. Daubs, 139 Ark. 53, 213 S.W. 4 (1919) as
follows:
Parol evidence to vary the terms of a written contract is one
thing; such evidence to enable the court to say what the
parties to a contract intended to express by the language
adopted in making it is quite another thing. The former is
not permissible. . . . The later is permissible, and is often
absolutely essential to show the real nature of the agreement. . . . Both rules are elementary, and do not conflict
in the slightest degree with each other. . . . A failure to

keep in mind the wide distinction between varying a
contract by parol evidence and resorting to such evidence
in aid of its construction often leads to error. [Emphasis
added.]

[1] The attorney who drafted the instrument for Stephens
testified that the purpose of the phrase was to give the plaintiffs
the lease hold interest in the well itself, and the Harrises would
then be responsible in the event other royalty owners in the unit
asked for royalties on the gas used in the Harrises’ house, or if the
State assessed severance tax on the gas used by plaintiffs, or if
there was a State conservation assessment on that production.
The attorney testified that there was no intent to give the plaintiff
all of the leases in the unit. Other correspondence between
plaintiffs, Stephens, and the Commission, shows that, at the time
of the instrument, the plaintiffs’ understanding and intention was
that they were to receive Stephens’ ownership only in the HarrisChitwood No. 1, subject to the conditions imposed in the
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instrument. In sum, the chancellor correctly allowed parol
evidence to aid in the construction of the vague phrase “Oil and
Gas Leases.”
12) The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in
remaking the instrument. W e summarily reject the argument.
The trial court did not remake or reform the instrument, rather it
allowed parol evidence for the purpose o f construing the instrument as written.
[3] T he plaintiffs’ final two arguments are treated together.
They argue that the trial court erred in failing to construe the
instrument most strongly against the party that prepared it and
that the decision is clearly erroneous. W hile an instrument is to be
construed most strongly against the party that prepared it, the
primary rule in the construction o f instruments is that the court
must, if possible, ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
parties. Sternberg v. Snow King Baking Powder Co., Inc., 186
Ark. 1 1 6 1 ,57S .W .2d 1057 (1933). Even when this instrument is
construed most strongly against the party that prepared it, the
plaintiffs cannot prevail. Finally, the ruling of the chancellor,
rather than being clearly erroneous, is eminently correct.
[4] In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue that the chancellor
erroneously concluded that Stephens held the lease to the 40 acres
by production in the neighboring unit. W e do not reach the merits
of this argument, as it was not discussed in the plaintiffs’ original
brief, and points may not be argued only in reply. Myers v.
Muuss, et al., 281 Ark. 188, 662 S.W .2d 805 (1984).
Affirmed.

Br o w n , J., not participating.
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BACKGROUND
The

events

leading up to this

lawsuit occurred

against

background that was recently discussed by the Supreme Court.

quote from the syllabus:

Mobil

We

In response to ongoing natural gas shortages,
Congress enacted the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
(NGPA), which, inter alia, established higher price
ceilings for "new" gas in order to encourage production
and carried over the pre-existing system of "vintage"
price ceilings for "old" gas in order to protect
consumers. However, recognizing that some of the vintage
ceilings might be too low, Congress, in S 104(b)(2) of
the NGPA, authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission to raise them whenever traditional pricing
principles under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) would
dictate a higher price.
After the new production
incentives resulted in serious market distortions, the
Commission issued its Order No. 451, which, among other
things, collapsed the existing vintage price categories
into a single classification and set forth a single new
ceiling that exceeded the then-current market price for
old gas;
established a "Good Faith Negotiation" (GFN)
procedure that producers must follow before they can
collect a higher price from current pipeline customers,
whereby producers may in certain circumstances abandon
their existing obligations if the parties cannot come to
terms; and rejected suggestions that the Commission
undertake to resolve in the Order No. 451 proceeding the
issue of take-or-pay provisions in certain gas contracts,
such provisions obligate a pipeline to purchase a
specified volume of gas at a specified price, and, if it
is unable to do so, to pay for that volume.
They have
caused significant hardships for gas purchasers under
current market conditions.
Oil

Exploration

&

Producing

Distribution COS. 498 U.S. 211, ___ ,

Southeas t ,

111

Inc.

v.

a

United

S . Ct. 615, 617 (3991)

"The HONORABLE BRUCE M. VAN SICKLE, Senior United States
District Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by
designation.

FACTS
The named plaintiffs/appellants are the representatives or a

class of about 3,000 royalty owners.

Their claims derive from oil

and gas leases on property located in the Arkoma Basin, in Western

Arkansas.

with

Defendant/appellee Arkla, Inc. (Arkla) is a corporation

its principal place of business in Shreveport,

Defendant/appellee Arkla Exploration Company (ASC)

Louisiana.

is likewise a

corporation with its principal place of business in Shreveport.
all times relevant,

At

it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Arkla,

Inc., and operated as the exploration and production company of

Arkla, Inc.

Arkla Energy Resources (AER), while not a named party,

is a division of Arkla, Inc, which operates Arkla's pipeline.
Defendants/appellees Jones and McCoy founded Arkoma

Arkansas corporation in 1981.
and McCoy owned one third.

as

an

Jones owned two-thirds of the stock

Jones was chairman of Arkoma's board of

directors and a corporate officer, and McCoy was Arkoma's president
and its chief geologist and engineer.

Arkoma was in the business

of natural gas exploration, development and production.

They sold

their interests in the company to ABC on December 31, 1986.

Jones

and McCoy were joined as defendants in this action by virtue of

this sale and the assignment to Arkoma, prior to that sale,
their interests in various producing wells involved.

of

The various Arkla entities will be collectively referred to as

the Arkla parties"

otherwise warrants.

or as,

simply,

"Arkla" unless the

context

In such cases they will be designated

"Arkla", "AER", "ABC", or "Arkoma" .

as

Development in the two primary fields, the Aetna and Cecil

Fields, commenced in the 1950'a.

Typically, mineral owners gave

leases to production companies which provided for the payment or

royalty based on the market value of 1/8 of the gas sold or used

off the premises, or 1/8 of the amount realised from the sale at
-3

■the wellhead.

Many leases in the Cecil Field contained a fixed

rate royalty provision which calculated the royalty at 1/8 or the

value fixed at a certain amount per thousand cubic feet (mc f) of
gas sold.
leases

Those fixed price leases were converted to market value

in separate litigation in the Chancery Court or Franklin

County, Arkansas,

in 1990.

On December 31, 1982, Arkoma, then owned by Jones and Mccoy,

agreed

with

Arkla,

a major

developer

in

the

Arkoma

Basin,

to

purchase one-half of Arkla's leasehold interest for $16 million.
Arkoma agreed to spend an additional
program over a four year period,

$30 million

in a drilling

and to share additional acreage

acquired in the Aetna and Cecil Fields from other lease owners.

This transaction resulted in Arkoma and Arkla owning virtually all
of the rights to drill new wells in the Aetna and Cecil Fields.
Shortly thereafter, Jones became a member of the board of Arkla.

On February 24, 1983, Arkoma and Arkla executed a gas purchase

contract, identified as GPC 5239, covering new wells to be drilled
in the Aetna and Cecil Fields, as well as any other acreage to be
acquired by Arkoma,

and by which Arkla agreed to pay Arkoma the

maximum lawful price under § § 102 and 103 of the NGPA.
o f the agreement, the §

At the time

102 price for the eras was $3.83 per m c f.

T h e contract containe d a pricing provision which allowed Arkoma to

renegotiate the contract price during its t e r m ,

It provided a 75%

minimum take-or-pay provision by which Arkla was obligated to take
75 % o f the daily deliverability from Arkoma's wells. or to pay for
a l ike amount of the gas at the contrast rate1.

Arkoma committed

Take or pay clause
A clause in a gas purchase contract requiring the purchaser to
take, or failing to take, to pay for the minimum annual contract
volume of gas under which the producer-seller has available for
delivery. Under such clause the purchaser usually has the right to
take gas paid for (but undelivered) in succeeding years.
Such gas
is called makeup gas. See Howard R. Williams and Charles J. Meyers,
Oil and Gas Terms, 249 (1959), citing Howell, Gas Purchase
-4

its working interests together with all royalty interests of the

appellant class to the contract.
Arkoma

began

an

aggressive

drilling

program,

achieving

a

success ratio in excess of 90% , against an industry standard of

only

approximately

50% .

In the process,

Arkoma

Arkla's largest suppliers of gas.

became

one

of

In 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 Arkla curtailed the quantities of gas it took from

Arkoma,

but did not honor the pay provisions of GPC 5239.

March, 1 9 8 6

By

;
•cw outstandlng take-or-pay billings from Arkoma to

Arkla were in excess of $16 million, and were accruing at a monthly
rate

of

approximately

$3 million.

resigned from the Arkla board.

gas it had not taken.

At

about that time,

Jones

Arkla then refused to pay for the

Arkla calculated that it was obligated to

buy 40,000 mc f p er day and was taking only 12,000 mcf; that the

potential take-or-pay obligation owed to Arkoma could reach $54

m illio n by the end o f 1986 and would increase by $40 million during
1987; and it determined that only 10% of the take-or-pay billings

were debatable.
Arkla

entered

into

negotiations

with

Jones

and

McCoy

to

resolve the problem. The negotiations for settlement or the takeor-pay obligations were resolved on December 31, 1986,

simply bought it*

.■<;*'„■«* .

The tax partnerships,

when Arkla

(controlled and

primarily owned by Jones and McCoy), which actually owned the
producing wells,
Jones and McCoy

.i of their int-erests to Arkoma as did

then

sto ck in Arkoma, i i i h g
g a in in g th e a b i l i t y
assigned

all

Contract act

l

all

of Jon e s ' and McCoy's

Arkoma P roduction Company and
GPC
Jo n e s and McCoy

drilling

to

Arkoma

in

exchange

for

prom issory n ote in th e amount o f $35 m illio n , guaranteed by
l.-i , i's&
*i.. ’C,
r aw!. :

f'.

■; • . i

b.

a

aec

.

d a tio n , F o u r t h A n n u a l I n s t i t u t e o n
) 5 0 17 0 ( 1 9 5 3 ) ,

That note was paid the same day.
"Neww ” Arkoma, that is, Arkoma as it existed after acquisition

by AEC,

also agreed to furnish Jones and McCoy,

free of cost to

them, 5 .8 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas over a five year period.

AER agreed to purchase this gas at prices beginning at $4.77 per
mcf in 1987, and escalating to $6.08 per mcf in 1992.

To secure

its obligation to purchase this gas, AER gave Jones and McCoy a

promissory note in the amount of $24 million, which was the net

present value of that gas purchase contract.

"New" Arkoma agreed to pay Jones and McCoy at the rate of

$1.62 per m c f for any newly established additional reserves.

the stock in Arkoma,

Arkla paid Jones and McC oy,

For

in addition to

satisfying the promissory note of $35 million, a cash consideration

of $14 million.

The total consideration paid by Arkla on December

31, 1986, w as $73 million, $35 million for the promissory note, $24

million for the gas purchase contract to buy free gas,
million for the Arkoma stock.

and $14

After the sales by Jones and McCoy to Arkoma of their lessee

interests,

period

of

and after the sale of Arkoma to AEC,
the

settlement

of

the

and during the

take-or-pay

claims

and

renegotiation of GPC 5239, Arkoma was wholly owned by AEC (Arkla's

production company)•
owned by Arkla.

And AER,

(the pipeline), vas also wholly

On February 13. 1987, AER, AEC and Arkoma amended the price

provisions

and

the

take-or-pay

provisions

in

GPC

3239.

They

reduced the contract price for gas from $3.83 per mcf to $2.20 per

mcf, and released gas on the spot market for sale at prices less
than $1.50 per mcf.

Appellants, who knew nothing of the details of

these confidential transactions of December 31, 1986, and February
13, 1987, and which the participants concealed from the Arkansas

Public Service Commission,

did not find out that they would be
-6-

receiving
received

less

money

their

January

March , 1987.
After

Jones

and

for

their

production

McCoy

royalty

interests

payments

directed

from

"New"

until

Arkla

Arkoma

they

in

to

late

drill

additional w ells, which they were entitled to do under the December
31,

1986,

concerned

transactions,

additional

consideration

drilling of the new wells.
and

McCoy

an

parties

the

additional

due

had

to

a

new

Jones

dispute.

and

McCoy

It

for

To resolve the dispute AEC paid Jones

$100 million

in

1989,

which

included

payment for reserves, the balance due on free gas, and interest.

On December 31, 1986, the fair market va lue of gas reserves in

the ground vas 83¢ per mcf.
$1.62 per mcf.

However, Arkla paid Jones and McCoy

The difference in the fair market value of the

reserves and the amount paid to Jones and McCoy represented the

value paid to Jones and McCoy to settle Arkla's take or pay dispute

under GPC

5239;

and

purchase contract.

to put

it in a position to amend

the gas

Plaintiffs/appellants assert, and defendants/appellees do not

contest,

that

except

for

the

fixed

rate

provisions took the following basic fora;

leases,

the

royalty

Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty on gas, casinghead gas,
distillate, condensate, and other gaseous substance produced
from said land and sold or used by Lessee off of the land or
in the manufacture of gasoline or other products, the market
value at the mouth of the wells of one-eighth (1/8) of such
products so sold or used.
on all gas, casinghead gee,
condensat e and distillate sold at the wells by the Lessee the
royalty shell be one-eighth (1/8) of the amount realised from
such sales.
The f ixed rate royalty provisions took the following form:

The Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty for gas the equal oneeighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calculated at the rate
of F our (4¢ ) cents per thousand cubic feet corrected to two
pounds above atmospheric pressure while the same ie being sold
or used off the premises.
7

Corporate

Appellees'

Appendix

at

132

(emphasis

added).

As

previously noted, in separate litigation the fixed rate leases were
oonverted to market value leases.

The fixed rate leases were:

Converted into leases providing for the payment of
royalties based on the proceeds received at the wellhead
from the sale of the produced gas. . . .
As to the
production from and after [July 1, 1990], all such
royalties shall be paid by the lessees according to the
proceeds, net of lawful taxes or assessments and other
roper charges authorized by law or the lease agreements,
f any, received by the lessees at the well for all gas
i
produced from the leased premises. . • . Arkla warrants
that the royalty payment level on its converted proceeds
leases will be no less than the royalty payment level
applicable to the market value leases as to which Arkla
is a lessee in the Cecil Gas yield Settlement Area.

p

Glen Morris, et al. v . Arkansas Louisiana Gee Company, et al., In
the

Chancery

Court

of

Franklin

County,

Arkansas,

Charleston

District, No. E-86-40, Final Order, Filed on May 21, 1990 (Exhibit
1 at 5) •

While

contracts

the

and

briefs

and

agreements

the

among

arguments

developers

refer
and

frequently

distributors

to

-

marketers of oil and gas - these plaintiffs/appellants claim as
royalty

owners

developers.

and

under

leases

between

royalty

owners

and

And th e plaintiffs/appellants ' rights in these matters

must arise out of th e oil and gas leases executed by the royalty
owners.

PROCEDURE
The lawsuit was filed February 23, 1990.

Jones and McCoy
1991.

Plaintiffs/Appellees

filed a motion for summary judgment January

1,

The Arkla defendants/appellees filed a motion for summary

judgment January

18,

1991.

Each group

the trial
motion for

Material Facts and, on March 4, 1991

the bench

during

a

hearing on

a

filed

its

Statement

of

court, ruling from
summary

judgment,

dismissed all claims against Jones and McCoy and all claims against
the other defendants,

except the claim based on a breach of the
— 8-

implied covenant to market gas.

After a bench trial that lasted

seven days/ the court found that the action was time barred and, on

April 21, 1991 entered its order dismissing the entire action.

At

the request of the appellants, on May 7, 1991, the court entered an
order affirming the previous dismissals.

DISCUSSION
While the statements of the issues vary among the parties, the

areas of concern expressed by the trial judge covered all the
issues, and that outline will be followed here.

Further, in review of these issues this court will be guided

by the standard that the appellate court views the case in the same
manner

as

the

trial

court, Western

Casualty

National Union Fire Insurance Co., 677 F.2d 789

&

Surety

Co.

v.

(8th Cir. 1982);

and we review the trial court's rulings on the applicable state lav
de novo.

Salve Reg ina College v. Russell, ___ U.S. ____ , 111 S. Ct.

1217 (1991).

We will turn, therefore, to the bench discussion of

the trial court at the hearing on March 4, 1991.

Turning now to the specific counts or claims made by
plaintiffs:

1.

General Breach of Duty of Fair Dealing Arising from a

Fiduciary Relationship.

In
(1980),

Amoco Production
the

Arkansas

Co

v

.

Supreme

Ware, 269
Court

Ark 313, 602

carefully

s.w.2d 620

reviewed

the

relationship of a developer to a lessor among a group of lessors
and recited the five implied warranties arising out of the lessor9

lessee relationship.

It found no fiduciary relationship and it

found no implied breach of fiduciary duty by lessee.

Instead,

it

defined the duty owed each lessor, and to the lessors as a group,
to act for the mutual advantage of both.
must

act

in

a

reasonable and prudent

It held that the lessee
manner,

using

reasonable

judgment, and not act arbitrarily.

In

this

contracts

case

with

the

the

take-or-pay

elements

pipeline/marketer

were,

Energy Regulatory Commission intervention,

in

the

because

developers
of

Federal

literally bankrupting

the pipeline, and those facts must be considered in evaluating the
reasonableness of defendants' actions.

We find it reasonable for

the defendants to make some effort to liquidate the take-or-pay
obligations of AEC.

2.

Third Party Beneficiaries.

Plaintiffs also sought relief as third party beneficiaries of
GPC 5239.

The Restatement defines third party beneficiaries as

follows:
(1)
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and
promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended
beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in
the
beneficiary
is appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will
satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay
money to the beneficiary; or
(b)
the circumstances
indicate
that
the
promisee intends to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance.
(2)
An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is
-10-

not an intended beneficiary.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, S302

(1981).

The comments to

this section provide no examples dealing with oil and gas leases.

Under the lease# the lessee's failure to perform will defeat

the lessee's interest, so it follows that there is not a continuing

obligation of performanca, i.e. the lessee can abandon the lease.

Nor does the lessee indicate by assignment of the lease th at he
intended to give the beneficiary any further benefit of promised

performance.

Therefore#

it follows that the lessors are only, at

the most, incidental beneficiaries and we affirm the trial court's

dismissal of this claim.
3.

Tortious Interference with a Contractual Relationship.

The next claim made is that of tortious interference with a

contractual relationship between the lessor and the lessee.

But,

the leases are admittedly assignable, and the original lessee and

transferor committed no unlawful act in exercising the right to
assign.

4.
This

problem.

We affirm the trial court's dismissal of this claim.

Unjust Enrichment
court's power

extends

to the

U.S. Const. Art. III, S 2# cl. 1.

equity

aspects

of

this

The doctrine of unjust

enrichment, that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich

himself inequitably at another's expense is not contractual, but is
equitable in nature.
"Take-or-pay"

Black's Law Dictionary 1705 (4th ed. 1968).

provisions

in a lease are nothing new.

See

Southwestern Legal Foundation# Fourth Annual Institute on Oil and
Gas Law and Taxation,151, 170 (1953).

It cannot be claimed by the

defendant that the parties to this lease could reasonably foresee

that# under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, lessors would find
their market shattered by the service of mandates
-11-

issued by the

Federal

Energy

mandates,

the

commercially

purpose

Regulatory

market

logical

for which

Commission.

price

of

gas

principle

it was

of

intended,

was

In

principle related to the age of the wells.

course

determined

fitness
but

the
of

rather

the
by

of

not

gas

an

those

by

for

the

the

illogical

The resulting market distortions forced the pipeline (AER) to

take only the old gas, at a price level which the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission felt the customer would accept.

The problems

of lessor /royalty owners which arise with reference to take-or—pay

clauses are generating substantial litigation as lessee/developers

and marketer/pipeline owners,

seek to resolve marketing problems

created in the course of administration of the National Gas Policy

Act of 1978 (NGPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432, which allowed gas price
increases through supervised deregulation.

Three factors cry for equity intervention in this situation:
1.

As shown by the legislative history of the NGPA,

at no

time during the development of the Act did Congress concern itself

with the impact of the Act on the rights of lessor/royalty owners.
See Legislative History, P.L. 95-621,

reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 7, 8800.
2.

1978, 95th Cong., 2d Ses s . ,

The artificial market distortion forced the pipeline, AER,

to take the "old" gas and sell it at an artificial price to the

consumers, and to abandon its efforts to honor the pay obligations. 3
3.

Where before the purchase of Arkoma,

consistent with that of the lessors,

primary

wholly

after AEC bought Arkoma its

interest was with the pipeline,

owned

representative

by

Arkla.

dealing

at

Thus

the

its interest was

arms-length

AER,

lessors
with

because both were
no

the

longer

pipeline.

had

a

And

lessors/royalty owners had no direct input into the making of the

take-or-pay

contracts

since

developer/pipeline contract.

take-or-pay

-1 2

is

a

part

of

the

By its nature,

gas can pass from on© collection point in a

reservoir to another, so a well, once opened, should be constantly

tapped; and at the sam e time since gas is difficult and dangerous
to store on the surface, and its users normally demand reliable,

constant, access to it, both the developer and the pipeline want a
constant flow.

As a result of the policies of the NGPA and the high demand

for gas in the 1980's, and the inherent nature of gas, developers

could,

and

contracts.

did,

get

S e e , K irk

favorable

take-or-pay

provisions

in

their

J. Brily, Com m ent, Royalty on TaKe-or-Pay

Payments and Related Consideration Accruing to Producers. 27 Hous.

L. Rev. 105 (1990).
But

the

NGPA developed the concept of

"vintagizing"

(i.e.

classifying by the age of the wells), gas for purposes of producer

price regulation that arose under the NGPA.

"Old flowing gas" vas

held to price ceilings far below the market clearing price of gas.

This pool of artificially low-priced gas has produced "horrendous"

distortions

of the gas market.2

market conditions,

And

it was this distortion of

and efforts to adapt gas production contracts

between developers and pipelines which generated the litigation
before us now.

See Richard J . Pierce, J r . , Lessor /Lessee Relations

in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38th Oil and Gas Inst. $ 8 . 0 4

Bender 1987 ).

(Matthew

It is inevitable that as developers and pipeline marketers

attempted to resolve problems of take-or-pay liabilities between
themselves, the claims of royalty owners would arise.

In M esa Petroleum Co. v. U .S. Dep t . of Int., 647 F. Supp. 1350
2. Lessor Lessee Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38th Oil
& Gas Institute, 8.04 (Mathew Bender 1987).
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(W.D.

La.

1986) , the Department of Interior, the royalty owner,

claimed royalty on a take-or-pay payment that M e s a , the developer,

had

received

from

the

pipeline.

The

court

denied

recovery,

pointing out that the lease required "production" and the
arose in an absence of production.

"pay"

In Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 86-536, slip op.

(B.D. La. 1986), the United States District Court reasoned that the

take-or-pay payments are intended to compensate the developer for
costs necessary to keep the well functioning, so they fall within

the definition of "production" as activities which take place after
the

successful

completion

monitoring, and maintanance .
The

case

Exploration Co.

was

v.

appealed

Hodel,

of

the

and

853

well,

reviewed

P.2d 1159

such

in

as

operations,

Diamond

(5th Cir.

Shamrock

1988).

The

Circuit court rejected the Shamrock decision and held flatly that
" [f]or purposes of royalty calculation and payment, production does

not

occur

earth."

Act

until

th e

Id. at 1168.

minerals

are

physically

severed

from

the

However, in January of 1988 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands

(OCSLA)

as administered by the Minerals Management Service,

(MMS) , revised its gas royalty evaluation regulation to provide:
"The value of gas

contract

shall be

the

• . • sold pursuant to an arm's-length

gross proceeds

accruing to the

lessee."

"Gross proceeds" are defined as "[t]he total monies and other

consideration accruing to an oil and gas lessee . . . includ[ing]

but

. . . not limited to: Take-or-pay payments;

reimbursements.
supra3.

that:

3.

. . . "

30 C.F.R.

206.151

. . , and other

ac quoted

in Brily,

The author of that comment concludes# as to m m s ' position

The 1992 CFR omits the words "take-or-pay payments".
-14-

The likelihood remains remote that a court will find that
the MMS overstepped its bounds by declaring that take-or-pay
receipts and other consideration accruing to the lessee give
rise to a royalty obligation.
The MMS's [sic] position
appears neither arbitrary nor capricious. The most reasonable
projection is that royalties will be due on federal lease
take-or-pay payments in the future.
Brily, supra,at 122.

Wyoming, as to leases where the state is the lessor, has held,
by analyzing the meaning of "production", that royalties are only
payable when the oil or gas is severed from the earth.
P ennzoil Co.,

State v.

752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988).

In Louisiana, as to state leases, the State Mineral Board has
adopted

a

resolution

addressed

to

the

take-or-pay

issue

and

announced that all sumo "attributable to gas contracts . . should
be paid to the state along with other royalties due."
Against this background of undertakings by governmental bodies
to

expand

the

scope

of

"royalty"

by

special

definitions

and

concepts of "constructive" production, we turn back to the problem
of leases between private parties, and an equitable analysis of the
meaning of "royalty" and its impact on "take" funds under a takeor-pay contract.
The Louisiana mineral code, Article 213 provides that:
"Royalty" as used in connection with mineral leases, means any
interest in production, or its value, from or attributable to
land subject to a mineral lease, that is deliverable or
payable to the lessor or others entitled to share
therein. . . . "Royalty" also includes sums payable to the
lessor that are classified by the lease as constructive
production.
-1 5 -

La. Rev. Stat . Ann. $31-213(5)

fair

(West 1992).

Arkansas statutory law has also addressed this problem of a
distribution

of

the

developers/lessees

preformance of its duty to market.
(Michie 1987) .

Arkansas lav states:

recoveries

See Ark. Code Ann.

in

§ 15-74-705

It shall be the duty of both the lessee, or his assignee,
end any pipeline company, corporation, or individual
contracting for the purchase of oil or gas under any oil,

gas, or mineral lease to protect the royalty of the
lessor's interest by paying to the lessor or his
assignees the same price including premiums, steaming
charges, and bonuses of whatsoever name for royalty oil
or gas that is paid the operator or lessee under the
lease for the working interest thereunder.
Ark. Code Ann. $ 15-74-705 (Michie 1987),

The next line of cases involve four decisions arising out of
the

same

follows.

case.

For

simplicity

these

cases

will

be

cited

The first decision, Frey v. Amoco Production C o . ,

as
708

F.Supp. 783 (E.D. La. 1989) will be referred to as Frey 1 .
The next in this group of cases, Frey v. Amoco. Production Co . , 943
F .2d 578

(5th Cir.

1991),

will

be referred to as

Frey

2.

third, Frey v. Amoco Production C o . , 951 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.

The
1992)

will be referred to as Frey 3 .

The fourth decision, Frev v. Amoco

Production C o . , 603 So. 2d 166

(La. 1992) will be referred to as

Frey 4 .

In Frey 1 , Amoco, the lessee/developer, cold gas from wells of
Frey

and

defaulted

others
on its

to

Columbia,

the

"pay" obligation.
-16-

pipeline/marketer.
Amoco had sued

Columbia
Columbia

in

Louisiana

state court;

and the case was settled by Columbia's

payment to Amoco of:
1.

Approximately $21 million as non-recoupable take-or-pay.

2.

Approximately $45 million as recoupable payment.

The Royalty owner-lessors then cued Amoco in the United States
District Court for a share of the settlement.
summary

judgment.

Columbia's motion.
Frey

on

ell

The

Both sides moved for

court denied Amoco's motion and granted

The court found that Amoco had paid royalty to

gas produced

and sold.

Am oco paid no

royalty

on

payments made in settlement of Columbia's failure to keep up its
take-or-pay payments.

And, as to the recoupment taken by Columbia,

Amoco had paid royalty at its standard rate, presumably below the
contract value of the recouped gas.

The court held that as to the

non-recoupable payment, Fray, et al., had no claim be cause no gac
had been produced and sold.

And it held that Frey, et al., had no

claim as to the recouped gas because they got the market value
under the long term contract of sale and therefore had suffered no
injury.

The case was appealed, Frev 2 .

The Fifth Circuit Court first

distinguished Frey from Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. using the
lease

language.

fraction of
sold."

th e

In shamrock
" a mo u n t

or

lessor

th e

v a lu e

received

as

royalty

a

of production saved, removed or

Diamond Shamrock Exploration Corp., 853 F.2d at 1163.

But,

in Frey 2 the lessor received a fraction of the "amount realized at
-1 7 -

the well

from the sale of gas."

See Frey 2 . at 581.

Also,

in

Shamrock the court applied federal law to determine the meaning of
the Department of Interior's lease then at issue; but in Frey 2 the
court applied the law of Louisiana, and the Louisiana Supreme Court
had not spoken to the issue.

The court then held that under the language "amount realized
at

the well

from the

under Louisiana law.

sale of gas",

production was not required

The court further held, inter alia, take-or-

pa y payments are part of the "amount realised" from the sale of gas
u n d er the lease, and thus such payments received by the lessee in
settlement of the take-or-pay dispute with its pipeline purchaser
for gas not taken, are subject to the lessor's royalty.
relying on Louisiana law,

Frey 2 at

580-84.

T h e court,

reasoned that the

payments

"constitute economic benefits that Amoco received from

granting Columbia the right to take gas from the leased premises,
a right Amoco got through the lease.

Id. at 584.

It determined

"it would be contrary to the nature of the lease as a cooperative
venture to allow a benefit, by any n a m e , that is attributable to
the

gas

lessee."

under

the

leased premises

to

inure

exclusively

to

the

Id.

The court also held that since the market value would vary
during the period of recoupment,

and the lessor's royalty share

would

$45

vary

recoupable
thousand

with
gas,

cubic

it,

and

since

million

was

paid

for

the

the volume of gas rather than the price per each
feet

(mcf)

varied;
-1 8 -

and

there

was

no

problem

of

computing the amount due the lessor's royalty interests.

On

the

take-or-pay

issue

the

circuit

court

reversed

the

district court's summary judgment for Amoco and hold the plaintiffs
were

entitled

to

their

share

payments received by Amoco.
On

a

petition

of

one-fifth

of

all

take-or-pay

Id. at 586.

for rehearing,

the

circuit

court

in

Frey

3

withdrew that portion of its opinion a s to Frey's entitlement to a
royalty interest on the take-or-pay settlement,

and certified to

the Louisiana Supreme court this question;
Whether under Louisiana law and the facts concerning the Lease
executed by Amoco and Frey, the L ease's clause that provides
Frey a 'royalty on gas sold by the Lessee of one-fifth (1/5)
of the amount realized at the well from such sales' requires
Am oco to pay Frey a royalty share of the take-or-pay payments
that Amoco earns as a result of having executed the Lease and
under the terms of a gas sales contract with a pipelinepurchaser.
Fr e y 3 at 68.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana accepted the certification in

Frey 4 after writing that:

The controversy centers around Frey's alleged entitlement to
a royalty share of the $66.5 million in take-or-pay amounts
paid by Columbia to Amoco under the Settlement Agreement. The
parties characterized $45.6 million of the total as a
"recoupable take-or-pay payment" and the remaining $20.0
million as a "non-recoupable take-or-pay payment."

Frey 4 at 170.
After recognizing the "fundamental principle that the lease

contract is the law between the parties defining their respective
-19-

legal rights and obligations” it observed that

"disinclined to

write a mineral lease in pursuit of equity, we are nonetheless

cognizant [that] the terms of a mineral lease are neither intended

to, nor capable of, accommodating every eventuality,”
172,

Frey 4 at

Further, the court observed;

When the parties made no provision for a particular
situation, it must be assumed that they intended to bind
themselves not only to the express provisions of the
contract, but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage
regards as implied in a contract of that kind or
necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose.

Frey 4 at 172.
The court also pointed out that it cannot realistically be

claimed that the lessor/royalty interest shares none of the costs

or risks of development,

and noted the risks

of drainage and

defective market forecasts are, for example, risks shared by the
lessor/royalty interest.
After

finding

that

Id. at 178.
the

Louisiana

Mineral

Coda

was

not

dispositive of lessor's right to take-or-pay payments, and that

. . the terms of a mineral lease are neither intended to, nor

capable of,

accommodating

every eventuality,"

it looked to the

leasehold parties' general intent, i.e. that the lessor supplied

the land end the lessor the capital and expertise necessary to

develop the land for the mutual benefit of both parties.

Id. at

clause and 2) to the lessor's
diligently the gas produced. Id.

market

172-73.

In so doing it looked to 1) the function of the royalty
implied

The court adopted the principle that:

obligation

to

[A]ny determination of the market value of gas which
admits the lessee's arrangements to market were prudently
arrived at consistent with the lessee's obligation, but
which at the same time permits either the lessor or the
lessee to receive a part of the gross revenues from the
-2 0 -

property
greater
than
the
fractional
division
contemplated by the lease,
should be considered
inherently contrary to the basic nature of the lease and
be sustained only in the clearest of cases.
Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp ., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1338 n.10 (La.
1982)
(citing Thomas Harrell, Developments in Non-regulatory Oil
& Gas Law, 30 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n, 311, 336 (1979)).4

In further support of the proposition that royalty owners were
a
entitled to share in take-or-pay monies and that the basic policy

of the lease required a division of the total benefits, it observed
that under a lease, as a bargained for exchange, the lessor would
not relinquish a valuable right without receiving something in
return. The take-or-pay contract gave the pipeline (AER) the right
not to take gas as well as the right to take gas; and such a right

had its price.

Id. at 173.

Further, almost invariably where take-

or-pay claims are settled, there are amendments to other provisions
of the (sale) agreement, particularly pricing and quantity

provisions, for example, a lowering of the taka obligations, even
though

the

settlement

agreement

clearly

allocates

settlement

payments between take-or-pay payments and modification of pricing
provisions.

(See 23 Tulsa L .J. No. 4 1988).

The lessee's action

has relinquished a valuable right and the lessor is entitled to
receive something in return.
[Further, i]f producers are allowed to retain ail of one
part of the settlement (the lump sum payment), but must
share with the royalty owners another part of the
settlement (proceeds from future sales under the
contract), producers have an artificial incentive to
maximize the lump sum settlement and minimize future
price.

Richard

J.

Pierce,

L e s s o r /L e s e e

R e la t io n s,

in

a

T u r b u le n t

G as

Market. 38 Inst. on O i l & Gas Law & Tax'n s-1, 8-2D (1987) .

4.
Professor Thomas Harrell, Professor of oil and Gas
Louisiana State University Law center, Baton Rouge, La.
-2 1 -

L aw ,

The

court

encompassed

the

in Frey

4 also found that the

contracted

sale price

of

the

"amount realized"

gas

per

mcf,

the

amount paid in recoupable take-or-pay payment and in non-recoupable

take-or-pay payments, and in settlement and release of the take-or-

pay agreement.
The

Id. at 179-80.

writings

in

reference

to

this

problem

developing recognition that a restrictive

show

a

strong,

interpretation of the

royalties clause in a conventional lease can b e inconsistent with
its bas ic purpose, and can produce results that are unintended

by

the parties, and unfair to the lessor. It is h o r n b o o k law that oil
and gas

leases are construed in favor of th e

lessor,

if for no

other reason than that the lessor is the uninformed and inexpert

Summer's Oil & Gas Perm Ed i t i o n V o l . 2 at

party to the bargain372.

is

We also recognize the Harrell rule, that a lease arrangement

in the

nature of

contributes the

a cooperative venture

land and

the

in which

lessee the capital

and

the

lessor

experience

necessary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both

parties.

And it follows from that rule that:

[A]ny determination[s] of the market value of gas which
admits the lessee's arrangements to market w e r e prudently
arrived at consistent with the lessee's obligation, but
which at the same time permits either the lessor or
lessee to receive a part of the gross revenues from the
property
greater
than
the
fractional
division
contemplated
by the
lease,
should
be
considered

inherently contrary to the basic nature of the lease and
be sustained only in the clear est of cases.

Harrell,
N or

supra, at 336.
is the Harrell analysis new or surprising.

s u p r a , at 135.

See Biley,

. ..decisions that lessee owe royalties on non"

recoupable payments

. . . are legally and equitably sound."

Id.

The author supports the proposition that the royalty on recoupable
payments

should not be paid until gas is delivered at the well
-22

head.

There the author recognizes the Hallard rule but seeks to

follow the lease provision for capture where possible.

Sea also,

Pierce, supr a , at S 8.03; John S. Lowe, Current Lease and Royalty

Problems

in the Gas

Industry, 23 Tulsa

L.J.

561;

and Royalty

Issues,_ Take or Pay Claims, and Division Orders, 24 Tulsa L.J. 511

at seq.

Two cases applying the concept that all benefits grounded

on the existence of a lease must be shared in accordance with the

lease are Amoco Production Co . v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d

280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) and Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp ., 418

s.w.2 d 1334 (La. 1982) where Harrell is cited favorably,

n. 10 .

6.

1335

Implied Covenant to Market Gas and Statute of Limitations.

An implied covenant to market is discussed in Summer's, O il

and Gas, § 400 (1959).
The writer's thesis is that, whether by
specific language in the lease or by implied covenant, leasees have

a clear duty to market oil and gas produced,

In Ware, the Arkansas

Supreme Court found five implied covenants in oil and gas leases.

They are:

[1.] A covenant to drill wells within a reasonable time,
testing the land for oil and gas;

[2.] a covenant to drill test wells within a reasonable
time after notice;
[3.]
a covenant, if oil and gas be found in paying
quantities, to proceed with reasonable diligence in
drilling sufficient number of wells to reasonably develop
the premises;

[4.] a covenant to protect the land from drainage
through wells on adjoining lands, by drilling offset
wells; and
[5.] a covenant to market the produce of producing
wells.
W a r e , 602 S.W.2d at 624

13, § 395 (vol. 2, 1959).

(citing Summers, The Law of Oil & Gas, ch

»23-

The test of compliance with an implied covenant is that of a

reasonable developer.

In this case, the trial court found that a

valid claim of failure to market had been asserted, but that it was
lost as time barred under Ark. Code Ann.

three year statute of limitations.

$ 16-56-105 (1987), the

However, based on the facts, we

hold that the action is not time barred.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 provides :

The following actions shall be commenced within three
years after the cause of action accrues:
9

3.
All actions founded on
liability, express or implied;

any

contract

or

The novation agreement between Arkoma and Arkla was formally

executed on February 13, 1987.

This action was brought by the

filing of a complaint on February 23, 1990, three years and ten
days later.
The trial court held the three year statute
applicable, found that the statute started to run when the novation

occurred,

and dismissed the suit as

time barred by ten days.

Appellants claim that it was not until March,

1987, when they

received their January royalty checks, that they w ere put on notice
of the change in their share.

Appellees admit that they attempted

to complete the novation of the tak e-or-pay contract as secretly as

possible.
We

recognize

that

the

clear

language

of

§

16-56-105

encompasses the oil and gas leases of appellants, including the

implied covenant which is an integral part of such lease.
The
precise statutory language is "all actions founded on any contract
or liability expressed or implied;".

In Scroqqin Farms Corp. v .

Howell. 216 Ark. 569, 226 S.W.2d 562 (1950), the Arkansas Supreme
Court observed that,

"if the plaintiff,

by reasonable diligence,

might have detected the fraud he is presumed to have reasonable

knowledge of it.”

Appellants claim the statute did not begin to run until they
-24-

had or, by the exercise of due diligence, should have known, the
facts that gave rise to their cause of action.

We agree.

The

statute did not begin to run until late March, 1991, and the action
is not time barred.

Summary judgment in favor of Jerrel W. Jones and Michael V.

McCoy on all issues is reversed.

The denial of dismissal as to the

issue of breach of the covenant to market is sustained.
The
dismissal of the action on the grounds that the action is barred by
the statute of limitations is reversed, and the case is remanded to

the trial
opinion.

court

for

further proceedings

consistent with this

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring.
I agree with the excellent discussion and opinion authored by

Judge Van Sickle.

I add these comments relating to the right of

the lessors to share in the take-or-pay settlement proceeds which
Jones and McCoy received.
As

manner

a

general rule, oil and gas leases should be construed in

so that

the

lessee and the

benefits arising from the land.

lessor split all

economic

Henry v. Ballard, 418 So. 2d 1334,

1338 (La. 1982) ; Harrell, Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil & Gas

Law. The

30th Annual

Institute on Oil

Southwestern Legal Foundation, 336 (1979).

and Gas Law Taxation,

The fact that a lease

conditions the receipt of royalties on the production, instead of

the sale, of gas, should not annul a lessor's right to receive

proceeds from take-or-pay contracts.
and for other reasons,

payments or settlement.
on -Pay Payments

From an economic standpoint

a royalty should be due on take-or-pay

See Comment, The Lessor's Royalty on Take-

Louisiana, 47 La. L. Rev. 589 (1987).
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The e x p re ss term s o f th e l e s s o r s ' le a s e s c o n d itio n t h e ir
r e c e ip t o f r o y a l t i e s on th e production of g a s , and therefore th ey
do n o t have a r ig h t to r e c e iv e a share o f a ta k e -o r -p a y payment
u n t i l p ro d u ctio n has occurred.
This r e s u l t i s f a ir because th e
p ip e lin e may e v e n tu a lly order d e liv e r y of a d d it io n a l gas under th e
c o n tr a c t t o "make-up" fo r th e e a r lie r d e f i c i e n c i e s .
When t h i s
"make-up" gas i s d e liv e r e d , fo r which th e p ip e lin e has a lrea d y paid
under th e "tak e-or-p ay" c la u s e , the l e s s e e w i l l pay th e le s s o r h is
sh are o f th e v a lu e o f th a t g a s, which w i l l approxim ate what th e
le s s o r would have g o tte n had he r e c e iv e d a sh a re o f th e " ta k e-o rpay" payment.
However, in t h i s c a s e , th e l e s s e e and t h e p ip e lin e term in ated
th e g a s-p u rc h a se c o n tr a c t and s e t t l e d th e p i p e l i n e ' s ta k e-o r-p a y
o b lig a t io n w ith a lump-sum payment moving from t h e p ip e lin e to the
l e s s e e . Because no fu tu r e purchases wer e lin k e d t o th a t payment,
under a s t r i c t re a d in g o f th e le a s e , th e le s s o r s perm anently l o s t
t h e i r r i g h t s t o r e c e iv e a p o rtio n o f th e r o y a l t i e s fr o m th e
s e t t le m e n t . J on es and McCoy may have reaped a s u b s ta n tia l b e n e f it
from t h e le a s e t h a t purported t o be u n r e la te d t o th e p rod u ction o f
g a s. This r e s u l t would c o n f l i c t with th e u n d erly in g purpose o f th e
l e a s e , which i s fo r th e le s s o r to r e c e iv e a sh a re o f a l l proceeds
gen era ted by th e la n d , and may have r e s u lt e d in Jones and McCoy
r e c e iv in g a p o t e n t i a l l y u n ju st enrichment. See Comment, R oyalty on
T ake-or-Pay__ Payments__and R elated __ Con s id e r a t io n s A ccruing t o
P ro d u cers, 27 Houston L. Rev. 105, 134 n .225 (1 9 9 0 ). In stea d o f
v iew in g th o s e p ro ceed s a s a w in d fa ll t h a t th e le s s e e s (but not th e
le s s o r s ) r e c e iv e d due t o co n tra ctu a l m aneuvering, a co u rt should
regard a lump-sum ta k e -o r -p a y s e ttle m e n t a s p a rt o f th e proceeds
a r is in g from th e s a l e s o f gas th a t p r e v io u s ly had been produced
under th e c o n t r a c t . S ee
Callery P r op
ertis
Comm' n , 335 F .2d lOO4 , 1021 (hold in g th a t ta k e -o r -p a y p r o v isio n s
g en er a te p roceed s from " sales" within th e meaning o f th e N atural
Gas A ct, 15 U .S .C . § 717(b) ( 1964) ) . E s s e n t i a lly , th e se ttle m e n t
cou ld r e p r e se n t how much Arkla was w illi n g t o pay:
1) to be
-2 6 -

released from the contract; and, in effect, 2) for the gas it has
already received under the contract.
Thus,

with regard to the lessors ' unjust enrichment claim

against Jones and McCoy, a substantial question or fact exists in

this case as to whether, under the leases, the lessors had a right

to receive a portion of the take-or-pay settlement that Arkla paid

Jones and McCoy.

If the lessors should have received a share of

those proceeds, then Jones and McCoy were unjustly enriched, and

they may have to share a portion of that "take-or-pay" settlement

with the lessors.

A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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[6] In sum, we do not decide either of petitioner’s arguments for the writ because they were not raised below We are
aware that the petitioner labels this an original action in this
court, and the petitioner might argue, on rehearing, that it is not
necessary in an original action to have raised the issues before the
trial court when the facts are undisputed. In some original actions
the argument might be valid, but not when the petition is based on
lack of venue. M onette R o a d Im provem ent Dist. v. D udley, 144
Ark. 169, 222 S.W . 59 (1920).
Petition denied.

ST E PH E N S PR O D U C T IO N C O M PA N Y , Arkla, Inc.,
Arkla Exploration Company, and Arkoma
Production Company v. Mildred M. JO H N SO N ,
Trustee o f the Mildred M. Johnson Trust,
Mamie J. Keifer, Rosamond Johnson, Nora
H ouse, Sara Adams Ridgway, Sunbelt
Exploration Company, and Jim T. Walker
91-333
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 7, 1992
A ppe a l & err or — parties mu s t a bst rac t essential
por ti o ns o f
THE PROCEEDINGS — WITHOUT PROPER ABSTRACT, CHANCELLOR IS
a f f ir m ed . — Where there was no abstract, by either the appellants
or the cross-appellants, of the complaint, the cross-complaint, or
either of the answers, nor was there an abstract of the chancellor’s
findings of fact or the final order, the appellate court had no choice
but to affirm the final order for failure of the parties to comply with
Rule 9(d); it is necessary for a party to abstract the essential
portions of the proceedings relied upon for appeal purposes.

Appeal from Franklin Chancery Court; R ichard E. G ardner, Jr., Judge; affirmed.
S m ith , Stroud, M cC lerkin, Dunn & N u tte r , by; H ayes C.
M cC lerkin and B arry A. Bryant, for appellants.

A

r k

.]

S te phe n s P r

o d . C o . v . Jo
Cite as 311 Ark. 206 (1992)

h ns on

207

Turner & Mainard , by: Lonnie Turner, for appellees.
R o be r t H. D u dle y , Justice. The chancellor cancelled the

oil and gas leases to some of the vertical geological formations of a
drilling unit. The defendant production companies appeal from
the chancellor’s finding that they have abandoned some o f the
formations, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal from the finding that
the defendants have not totally abandoned the leases.
We cannot reach the merits o f the case and must affirm the
final order on both direct and cross-appeal for failure o f the
parties to comply with Rule 9(d) of the Rules of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals. There is no abstract, by either the
appellants or the cross-appellants, o f the complaint, the crosscomplaint, or either o f the answers. An abstract o f those pleadings would be helpful. There is no abstract o f the chancellor’s
findings of fact or of the final order, and these are essential in
order to understand this case. Equally critical are certain exhibits
which are not abstracted or copied. The testimony o f the
witnesses about the exhibits is abstracted, but, without the
exhibits, much of the testimony about the issues is meaningless.
[1] It is necessary for a party to abstract the essential
portions of the proceedings relied upon for appeal purposes.
Otherwise, all seven members of the court would have to pass,
from office to office, the one transcript and the one set o f exhibits
in order to examine and understand the case, and, with the
number of cases submitted, that is impossible. W e have no
alternative other than to do as we have done in other comparable
cases and affirm the decree of the chancellor. See Hunter v.
Williams, 308 Ark. 276, 823 S.W .2d 894 (1992); Meyers Gen.
Agency v. Lavender, 301 Ark. 503,785 S .W .2d 28 (1990); Cash
v. Holder , 293 Ark. 537, 739 S.W .2d 538 (1987); and Zini v.
PercifuL 289 Ark. 343, 711 S.W .2d 477 (1986).
Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 9(d).

Hol t , C. J. and Br o w n , J., not participating.
Special Chief Justice W r ig h t and Special Justice R oss
concur.

Ro be r t R. W rig ht , Special Chief Justice, concurring. I

concur in this decision with great reluctance. I concur only
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because Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals has been violated. It is my view that Rule 9 should be
amended to provide that as soon as the problem has been
discovered, the attorney involved be given thirty days in which to
correct the problem by filling a new abstract or such missing
documents as may present a problem. As it exists in its present
form, Rule 9 is extremely harsh to litigants and lawyers alike. It is
procedural in nature, but its application is punitive. The Rule
should be amended as stated to ameliorate its harshness and to
prevent injustice to those litigants whom it affects.
The situation in this case was such that the justices involved
had to place great reliance upon the transcripts. There were five
volumes, and I read most o f them totally and some in part. I also
examined the legal issues, involved in a number o f cases, treatises,
and law review articles. I felt qualified after that to render a
judgment on the merits.
It is my opinion, in that regard, that the Chancellor would
have been affirmed, at least in large measure, if the merits had
been reached. Under those circumstances, the application of Rule
9 would seem to make little difference in the outcome. While
there was conflicting testimony and evidence, this Court adheres
to the proposition that the Chancellor will be affirmed unless his
holding is clearly erroneous. If for no other reason, affirmance
would probably have resulted even though I did not agree with
him in some respects.
One thing that I would have commented on if the case had
been decided on the merits is a rule in Arkansas oil and gas law
that seems not to be the better rule and, in fact, is contrary to that
of some of our neighboring, oil-producing states. In Arkansas, a
new lessee can obtain a second lease from the lessor and then
notify the first lessee that his lease is not any good due to the
failure to drill. Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W .2d 366
(1983); S. Wright, The Arkansas Law o f Oil and Gas, 10 U. Ark.
Little Rock L J . 699, 705 (1988). The better rule is that there
should be a burden on the lessor to notify the lessee that if a well is
not drilled within a certain reasonable period of time, the lease
will be cancelled and there will be a new lessee. E. Kuntz, J. Lowe,
O. Anderson, & E. Sm ith, Oil and Gas Law 287 (1986). The
effect of non-drilling would not necessarily cancel the lease,
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which would still be subject to the prudent operator standard and
the implied covenant of reasonable development, but requiring
notice might help to prevent litigation, which should be an object
of the judicial system.

J a me s A. R oss, J r ., Special Associate Justice, concurring. I
concur in the results reached by the Court, but for different
reasons. I would not affirm because of a failure to comply with
Rule 9(d) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals. However, based on the merits o f the case, I would affirm
the Decree of the Chancery Court of Franklin County on both
direct appeal and cross-appeal.

Levonia G R A Y v. STA TE of Arkansas
C R 92-846
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 7, 1992
1.

C ri

min a l l a w

—

pa s s e n g e r f o u n d by t r i a l c o u r t n o t to

be
REMAINING EVIDENCE CLEARLY CONNECTED
a ppe l l a n t to th e c r im e . — Where the trial judge found that the

a n ACCOMPLICE —

2.

passenger was not an accomplice, even though the police found him
crouched down in the vehicle as they drove up to investigate, the
appellate court could not say on that ambiguous circumstance that
he was an accomplice as a matter of law.
C ri m i n a l l a w — e v i d e n c e cl ea rl y c o n n e c t e d a ppe l l a n t t o
the c r i m e . — The remaining evidence connecting the appellant to
the robbery was clear beyond any serious question — the clerk

described the robber as a black male wearing white pants, camouflaged jacket and ski mask; two officers saw a man dressed
accordingly enter and leave the store headed toward the parked
vehicle containing papers belonging to the appellant; the ski mask
was found some thirty feet from the car, as were tracks leading
toward the car and then away from it; the clerk identified the
appellant’s voice as that of the robber; the evidence, though
circumstantial, was entirely adequate to support the conviction.
Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Ja ck L. Lessenberry ,

